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ABSTRACT
Presented herein are techniques that involve utilizing a blockchain-based
methodology that provides a defense against rollback attacks on a virtual machine and is
scalable for other application areas. In one example, a solution is provided to avoid
rollback attacks during restoration of a virtual machine under the assumption of a malicious
host and hypervisor. Techniques presented herein also address problems associated with
an untrusted host under certain assumptions.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Malicious login attempts on a virtual machine (VM) are typically rate limited by
blocking the number of wrong attempts that can be entered by a user. However, this is not
an effective method to stop the number of login attempts as the state of a virtual machine
can always be restored and played back in order to restore the number of login attempts.
By restoring a virtual machine in this manner, the malicious login attempts on the virtual
machine can effectively become infinite.
The state of a virtual machine is easily accessible from the hypervisor and host. In
some instances, the state of a virtual machine can also be gained through other side
channels using various hacks or other malicious means. Thus, through the use of such
hacks or malicious means, it may be possible to gain unlimited attempts at hacking a virtual
machine, which opens a security vulnerability.
Consider an example in which a malicious entity performs ten password attempts
to try and login to a virtual machine. In this example, the malicious entity would be locked
out of future attempts unless the state of the virtual machine is replayed or forked, in which
case the malicious entity could potentially have infinite attempts.
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Techniques presented herein utilize a blockchain-based methodology that provides
for the ability to defend against malicious agents gaining infinite login attempts to a virtual
machine. Additionally, techniques presented herein address problems that may be
associated with an untrusted host under certain assumptions.
A solution is provided to prevent a malicious agent from reusing the same state of
a virtual machine in order to obtain infinite login attempts. In at least one implementation,
a component providing secure computation (e.g., Intel® SGX, ARM® TrustZone®, etc.)
can be utilized to perform techniques associated with the solution. A secure shared storage
for blockchain with frequent updates from non-adversarial agents may also be utilized in
order to avoid a host taking control of the blockchain ledger. For example, the secure
computation component on the host can be utilized in order to validate the blockchain and
also to perform operations on an input pre-committed on the ledger by a host. Using precommitment, the solution can limit the host from providing different inputs on the same
virtual machine state, thereby securing the virtual machine against such attacks launched
by the host.
Consider a mathematical description and definition of the set-up of the blockchain
solution in which O denotes an object of interest. In one example, consider that this could
be a disk image for a virtual machine that needs to be protected against a rollback attack.
In this example, let TF denote a trapdoor function (note, this mathematical description may
not follow the exact definition of a set, but a general understanding of trapdoor functions
may be utilized for this description).
Further, let O' <- TF(O) and K be the key to invert the trapdoor function. Therefore,
O <- TFInv(K, O') is a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm, but otherwise there
does not exist a PPT algorithm to invert TF without the knowledge of K. Additionally, Let
P be a PPT program that generates the valid key K based upon a given input. In one
example, this input may be a user password or the like. Mathematically, a description can
be provided such as: K <- P(I), where I is the input to the program (e.g., the password in
this example).
Additionally, let EP <- E(K', P), where EP denotes an encrypted program which is
encrypted using an authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) algorithm E
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using key K'. The AEAD can be used in order to hide the details of converting I to K from
the host (using encryption) and to avoid changes (such as bit flips) to P by changing EP.
Further, let VM <- {EP, O', ...} denote a VM image that can be restored on a host
and let L denote a ledger maintained by a third party using a protocol similar to blockchain.
The ledger is to be present at a shared location maintained by a third party in order to avoid
any forgery by the possibly malicious host. In addition, let C be the public certificate of
the third party maintaining the shared ledger. The public certificate (C) can be used to
verify whether L is a fake ledger or not since the host may fake network communications
and present a fake ledger. Let SL denote the signature by the third party over a hash of the
ledger.
Finally, let OID be an identifier (ID) provided by a user to uniquely identify each
distinct copy of O. This can be a publicly known identifier used to calculate how many
times attempts have been made to compute O.
For the present example, consider various steps (in which certain steps may be
highlighted in Figure 1, below) as follows:


A user sets up K', C, OID and any other data for the secure
computation unit (e.g., SGX : SetupSGX(K', C, OID, ...)), as
generally shown in Step 1 for Figure 1.



When the host would like to restore the VM image, the host is to
execute P in order to restore O.



The host pre-commits to a given input by declaring (H(I), OID) on
a ledger L maintained by a third party and H is a one-way function
(preferably a cryptographic hash function), as generally shown at
Step 2 in Figure 1. Further, the host requests L and SL from the third
party, which is sent to the host as shown at Step 3 in Figure 1.



The host sends (EP, L, H, I, SL) to the secure computation unit, as
generally shown at Step 4 in Figure 1.



The secure computation unit verifies the authenticity of ledger L
using C and SL and, further, verifies the integrity of ledger L using
hash values present in the ledger.
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The secure computation unit verifies any state that it is to check. In
this example, this can be the number of times a login has been
attempted for the VM in which the latest commitment corresponding
to OID corresponds to H(I).



If everything looks fine, the secure computation unit computes P
from EP using the stored key K': P <- D(K', EP), where D denotes
the decryption function corresponding to E.



The secure computation unit executes P upon input I to compute K
in which K <- P(I), as generally shown at Step 5 in Figure 1.



The secure computation unit returns K to the host (e.g., K <SGX(EP, L, H, I, SL), as generally shown at Step 6 in Figure 1.



The host computes O <- TFInv(K, O') and follows up with further
processing on the VM. In this example, this can include restoring
the snapshot of the VM.

Thus, the above steps and Figure 1, below, illustrate that blockchain can be utilized to
protect against rollback attacks launched by the hypervisor on a virtual machine.

Figure 1
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In some implementations, the techniques discussed above may be valid only to
unlock an object of interest a first time. Once the object of interest is unlocked, additional
security may not be provided for subsequent snapshotting/restoring. Thus, the techniques
are assumed to be secure only for cases in which some secret object needs to be unlocked,
similar to the case of unlocking a smart phone or the like.
Techniques presented herein may also be applied to other applications such as, for
example, to provide limited execution of certain proprietary algorithms. This may be
helpful for instances in which there is a need to provide trial versions of an algorithm that
is limited by a number of times it can be used. For example, consider that P is a proprietary
algorithm that an entity desires to keep secret from a host in which the host is only allowed
to execute the proprietary algorithm an N number of times. In this example, there is no
need for TF, O, and O' and K will denote the output of P that is of interest to the host. For
such an application, the ledger can be used to limit the number of times the host executes
the proprietary algorithm.
In summary, techniques presented herein utilize a blockchain-based methodology
that provides a defense against rollback attacks on a virtual machine and is scalable for
other application areas. In one example, a solution is provided to avoid rollback attacks
during restoration of a virtual machine under the assumption of a malicious host and
hypervisor. Techniques presented herein also address problems associated with an
untrusted host under certain assumptions.
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